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CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
N.Y. CONST. art. , § 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to... be confronted with the witnesses against him....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Ortiz'
(decided October 21, 1997)
Enrique Ortiz was convicted of attempted murder and illegal
weapons possession, after shooting at two New York City police
officers.2 After they were treated at a hospital, the two officers
were taken back to the scene, and identified defendant as the
assailant.' The trial court refused to suppress the identification of
the defendant, because the "showup" was "proximate in time and
space to the crime and the Appellate Division affirmed." 4 The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the People failed to meet
their burden of proving that the showup was not unduly
suggestive.'
'90 N.Y.2d 533, 686 N.E.2d 1337, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1997).
2 Id. at 534-35, 686 N.E.2d at 1338, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
3 Id. at 535, 686 N.E.2d at 1338, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
4 Id. at 536, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
5 Id. at 535, 686 N.E.2d at 1338, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 244. The Court of
Appeals held that the prosecution "failed in their threshold responsibility to
call any witness who could testify to the circumstances under which defendant
was actually identified." Id. at 538, 686 N.E.2d at 1340, 664 N.Y.S.2d at
246. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This amendment provides the accused
with the right "[in all criminal prosecutions ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." Id. See also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision
permits the accused in "any trial in any court whatever... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." Id.
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On March 22, 1993, Officer Colon and Officer Sullivan were
responding to a radio dispatch to give assistance to an ambulance,
when they heard gunshots.6  They saw a man outside an
apartment building, who shot at them when they approached him,
and they shot back.7 After ten seconds of shooting, the man
fled.8
Soon after this confrontation, Officers Reardon and Almodovar
arrived on the scene, and the four policemen searched for the
assailant together. 9 Officer Sullivan held one suspect while the
other three officers entered the building, observing several male
teenagers in the lobby. 10 Officer Almodovar told Officer Reardon
he saw "one of the people from the lobby" come from "an
apartment down the hall," so Reardon knocked on the door." He
questioned the woman who answered regarding any disturbances
in the building, and then saw a man run across the apartment to
another room. 12  Both officers entered, and discovered the
defendant lying on his bed, sweating and breathing hard." They
took him out to the lobby and placed him with two other
identified male teenagers."
Defendant was handcuffed, and waited with other uniformed
officers until Colon and Sullivan were brought back for
identification.' 5 Reardon did not observe the eventual showup
identification by Colon and Sullivan, since he exited the building
just as Colon and Sullivan were returning. 16
6 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 535, 686 N.E.2d at 1338, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
7id.
8Id.
' Id. This information came from Officer Reardon, who was the only
witness called by the People to testify at the suppression hearing. Id.
10 Id. at 535-36, 686 N.E.2d at 1338, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
11 Id. at 536, 686 N.E.2d at 1338, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. Reardon then went back inside the apartment and found a handgun "on
the ground outside the window of the room" that defendant had run from. Id.
"s Id. The two officers had since been taken to the hospital. Id.
16 Id. at 536, 686 N.E.2d at 1338-39, 664 N.Y.S.2d 244-45.
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Despite the presence of other witnesses at the identification,
none of them testified at the hearing. 7 At the close of this
hearing, defendant moved to suppress the on-scene identification,
first, because the People did not fulfill "their initial burden of
proving that the showup was proper," and secondly, because
there were no witnesses testifying who had actually seen Colon
and Sullivan identify defendant.18 The court denied defendant's
motion, holding that since the showup "was proximate in time
and place to the crime," it was permissible.' 9
The Court of Appeals first rejected the argument that defendant
did not preserve his objection.20 Defendant objected to the
prosecution's failure to meet their burden of proof, and to the
absence of proof from any eyewitness to the identification."' For
the Court of Appeals, this objection was sufficient to bring the
issue to the attention of the trial court, and to preserve it for
review. 2
After overcoming that preliminary holding, the Court of
Appeals, relying on People v. Rivera,' explained that showup
identifications have not been readily accepted because of their
17 Id. at 535, 686 N.E.2d at 1338, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 244. Only Officer
Reardon testified at the suppression hearing. Id. See supra note 9.
18 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 536, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 245. The
showup is considered proper if the prosecution can prove that the identification
was not conducted in an unduly suggestive manner. Id. at 537, 686 N.E.2d at
1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
19 Id. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the trial court, for
the same reasoning stated above. Id. at 535, 686 N.E.2d 1338, 644 N.Y.S.2d
244. See People v. Ortiz, 232 A.D.2d 180, 648 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Ist Dep't
1996).
20 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 536, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
21 Id. at 537, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
n Id.
23 22 N.Y.2d 453, 239 N.E.2d 873, 293 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1968). In Rivera,
two witnesses identified defendant. Id. at 454, 239 N.E.2d at 873, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 271. They both identified him when he was brought to the
hospital, where one witness had been shot and was undergoing treatment. Id.
at 454-55, 239 N.E.2d at 873-74, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 272. A 4-3 majority
affirmed Rivera's conviction, holding that it was reasonable for the police to
take defendant to the hospital to be identified. Id. at 455, 239 N.E.2d at 874,
293 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
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suggestive nature.24 However, citing to People v. Duuvon, 5 the
Court of Appeals recognized that some identifications at the scene
of the crime are not "presumptively infirm." 26  While Duuvon
stood for the premise that showup identifications close in time
and space to the actual crime may be admissible, if found to be
reliable and not suggestive,2 7 People v. Adams2 established that
when no effort is made to provide for "a reliable identification,"
and the procedure used gives off the aura of suggestibility, the
showup will be suppressed. 9
24 Id. at 455, 239 N.E.2d at 874, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (Fuld, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that presenting the defendant to the "two witnesses in a
hospital is precisely the sort of 'grossly and unnecessarily suggestive'
identification technique which this court has condemned."). The majority held
that the witnesses had "ample opportunity to observe defendant during
commission of the crime," and that since police were not sure the wounded
witness would recover, there was no time for a line-up. Id. Additionally, the
Rivera majority held that there was no "uncertainty and lack
of... opportunity to see and remember, as to render the hospital
identification ... suggestive." Id. However, the dissent argued that the three
minutes in which the witnesses claimed to see the defendant at the scene of the
crime was not enough to warrant that their testimony was not tainted by the
misleading circumstances of the hospital showup. Id. at 456, 239 N.E.2d at
874, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting). Unlike Ortiz, the same
witnesses who saw defendant during the act in question, and at the hospital
identification, testified at trial. Rivera, 22 N.Y.2d at 454, 239 N.E.2d at 873,
293 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
' 77 N.Y.2d 541, 571 N.E.2d 654, 569 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1991).
26 Id. at 543, 571 N.E.2d at 655, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (holding that searches
must be "scrutinized very carefully for unacceptable suggestiveness and
unreliability," but the "apprehension of the perpetrator very near the crime
scene, coupled with the temporal proximity to the commission of the crime,
withstands this scrutiny."). Duuvon involved another robbery attempt, where
the owner of a dry cleaner identified defendant as he was being placed under
arrest minutes after the robbery. Id. at 543, 571 N.E.2d at 655-56, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 347-48. After his arrest, the police brought defendant back to the
dry cleaners, where a witness/employee identified him. Id. at 543, 571
N.E.2d at 656, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
27 Id. at 543, 571 N.E.2d at 655, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
2853 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981)
29 Id. at 249, 423 N.E.2d at 382-83, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 905. In yet another
robbery case, the eyewitnesses identified defendants at the police station
approximately 2-2 / hours after the robbery occurred, rather than soon after
882 [Vol 14
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Next, the Ortiz court discussed the burdens that the parties must
bear in determining the admissibility of a showup identification."
It cited to People v. Chipp31 for the rule that while defendant has
the burden of proving undue suggestiveness, the People have the
initial burden of validating the admission of the showup.3"
Usually, evidence that the showup was conducted in proximate
time and space to the crime will satisfy this initial burden under
the occurrence. Id. at 245-46, 423 N.E.2d at 380-81, 440 N.Y.S.2d 903-04.
The prosecution argued that the witness' ability to make in-court identifications
should also allow proof of the suggestive showup they participated in. Id. at
249, 423 N.E.2d 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d 905. They cited to a Supreme Court
case, Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1980), which held that there was
no federal due process right to exclude evidence of a suggestive pre-trial
search, but the Court of Appeals held that it could use the New York State
Constitution to provide additional due process protections. Id. at 249-50, 423
N.E.2d at 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06. The Adams court also held that the
exclusionary rule against suggestive showups was different from the
exclusionary rule governing confessions and Fourth Amendment violations,
because those two rules interfere with the fact-finding process, while the
showup rule "bears directly on guilt or innocence." Id. at 250-51, 423
N.E.2d at 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 906. Nevertheless, this identification was
deemed to be harmless error, because in-court identification was still allowed,
and the five other pretrial viewing that were correctly performed could still be
admissible. Id. at 251, 423 N.E.2d at 384, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
o People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 686 N.E.2d 1337, 1339, 664
N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (1997).
3 75 N.Y.2d 327, 552 N.E.2d 608, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1990).
32 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 696 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (citing
Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d at 335, 552 N.E.2d at 613, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 77).
However, the Chipp court's rule was stated differently than how the Ortiz
court applied it:
While the People have the initial burden of going forward to
establish the reasonableness of the police conduct, and the
lack of any undue suggestiveness in a pretrial identification
procedure, it is the defendant who bears the ultimate burden
of proving that the procedure was unduly suggestive. Where
suggestiveness is shown, it is the People's burden to
demonstrate the existence of an independent source by clear
and convincing evidence. Absent some showing of
impermissible suggestion, however, there is no burden upon
the People ....
1998
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Duuvon.33 However, the People still must produce evidence that
their identification was not unduly suggestive."
The Ortiz court supported their holding with criminal procedure
statutes.35 Section 710.60 of the Criminal Procedure Law
normally requires a defendant to support the ground alleged with
specific facts, but the defendant is exempt from that burden here,
because he would not know the facts surrounding the
identification procedure.36 This is partly due to the fact that the
33 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245. See
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
34 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245. See
supra note 32.
31 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537-38, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245
(citing N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 710.60(3)(b) (McKinney 1986)). Criminal
Procedure Law § 710.60(3)(b) provides:
The court may summarily deny the motion (to suppress
evidence) if ... [t]he sworn allegations of fact do not as a
matter of law support the ground alleged; except that this
paragraph does not apply where the motion is based upon the
ground specified in subdivision ... six of section 710.20.
Id. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 710.20(6) (McKinney 1992). Section
710.20(6) states:
Upon motion of a defendant who... claims that improper
identification testimony may be offered against him in a
criminal action, a court may... order such evidence be
suppressed or excluded upon the ground that it ... [c]onsists
of potential testimony regarding an observation of the
defendant either at the time or place of the commission of the
offense or upon some other occasion relevant to the case,
which potential testimony would not be admissible upon the
prospective trial of such charge owing to an improperly made
previous identification of the defendant by the prospective
witness.
Id.
36 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 538, 686 N.E.2d at 1339, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (citing
People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218, 647 N.E.2d 1321, 623 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815
(1995)). The Dixon court held that:
Alleging facts to support a motion to suppress testimony
concerning an out-of-court identification is a burden that a
defendant no longer carries on a motion for a Wade hearing
(see CPL 710.60(3)(b) (1995)). As this Court has previously
explained, the 1986 amendments to CPL 710.60(3)(b)
884 [Vol 14
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defendant is dependent upon the People's evidence of
suggestiveness,37 since a defendant "does not have an absolute
right of compulsory process at such hearings. "" Therefore, if
the prosecution did not have the burden of presenting such
evidence, criminal defendants would be unfairly prejudiced in
establishing that an identification was unduly suggestive.39
The Court of Appeals concluded that although the People met
its initial burden, and proved that the showup was "reasonable
under the circumstances," 4 they called no witnesses that could
testify as to the circumstances of the actual identification
proceeding.4' From the scant testimony that was presented, there
was no evidence that the identification procedure was conducted
properly or improperly. 42 Although this burden is minimal, the
People failed to meet it, and thereby failed to produce evidence of
suggestiveness of an on-site identification.43
Both the federal and state constitutions have a confrontation
clause, requiring that a criminal defendant tried in any court must
be allowed the opportunity to "confront . . the witnesses
against him." 44 In order for a witness to be competent to testify,
relieved a defendant of the obligation to plead facts
concerning a "previous identification of the defendant by the
prospective witness" (CPL 710.20(6)), likely for the reason
that in many instances a defendant simply does not know the
facts surrounding a pretrial identification procedure and thus
cannot make specific factual allegations.
Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d at 222, 647 N.E.2d at 1323, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
37 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 538, 686 N.E.2d at 133940, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 245-
46.
38 Id. at 538, 686 N.E.2d at 1340, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 246. There is no due
process requirement for an identification hearing to be conducted ex parte,
because any inconsistencies in pretrial identifications can be exposed in cross-
examination and enunciated upon in summation. People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d
327, 338-39, 552 N.E.2d 608, 615, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 79 (1990).
39 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 538, 686 N.E.2d at 1340, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
4 id.
41 id.
42 Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 538, 686 N.E.2d at 1340, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
43 id.
4See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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he or she must possess "personal knowledge." 41 While the
Supreme Court has refused to establish a "brightline rule" to
exclude identifications where the People cannot bring forth
sufficient evidence that the showup was not unduly suggestive,
the Court of Appeals has found one under the New York State
Constitution.46 New York State requires the People to provide
witnesses with personal knowledge to testify as to the procedure
of the identification, to establish a lack of suggestiveness, and
completely relieves the defendant of most of his burden to prove
suggestiveness.47 In so holding, the Court of Appeals allows
defendants to be "confronted with the witnesses against him" 48 by
rejecting testimony from those who do not possess personal
knowledge, thus upholding the Confrontation Clause of the New
York State Constitution.49
41 See FED. R. EvID. 602 (requiring witnesses to possess personal knowledge
before they can testify under oath).
46 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
41 People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 249-50, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383, 440
N.Y.S.2d 902, 905-06 (1981). See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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